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1 Introduction1
The most popular paradigm currently explaining
state failure in India falls within the broad church
of neo-liberal political economy (NPE). This para-
digm popularity in recent work on India extends
to official and academic circles. The picture of the
Indian state that emerges in the NPE paradigm is
a generalized one: a predatory state, debilitating
society by generating rent-seeking impulses. In
previous work we sought to evaluate the fulmina-
tions of this school, by looking at whether the NPE
picture of Indian state failure was validated by the
fiscal record of the Indian state. We found it diffi-
cult to see a vindication of the NPE hypothesis in
government expenditure data on India; indeed it
was possible to reject this plank of the NPE
hypothesis using an analysis of the government
fiscal record from 1960 to 1985 (Roy 1994; 1995).
An important part of the NPE analysis is 'rent-seek-
ing'. Here, it emerged there is a considerable con-
sensus even among those who dissent from the
NPE view that 'rent-seeking' was, if not a cause,
then at least a symptom of Indian state failure.
There is evidently a rare consensus that Indian eco-
nomic atrophy could be linked to the fact that the
rent-seeking Indian state did not (Rudolph and
Rudolph 1987), could not (Lal 1988), or would
not (Bardhan 1984) provide an adequate basis for
state-led development.2 We feel that this superfi-
cial unity in diagnosis is, possibly, generated by the
portmanteau way in which the term 'rent-seeking'
is used.
Explaining this consensus requires a theoretical
and empirical unpacking of the notion of rent-
seeking and its application to Indian political and
fiscal realities. Clearly, corruption has been a cen-
tral notion that, prima facie, unifies various strands
of thought about rent-seeking. This article pre-
sents some of that unpacking with particular atten-
tion to the emergence of the 'black economy' in
India and the role of corruption in that emergence.
We argue that the black economy played a critical
role in the softening of the government budget
constraint in the 1980s, inter alia, it reflects a
I would like o thank Barbara Harriss-White for her
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
A detailed discussion of these positions can be found
in Roy (1994).
decline in the fiscal surplus accessible to the state.
The origins and disposition of black income are
traceable, it is argued, to petty bourgeois groups
rather than to direct corruption of the type identi-
fied in the rent-seeking literature.
2 Rent-Seeking, the 'Black
Economy' and Corruption
The theory of rent-seeking argues that state inter-
vention incurs losses when resources are unproduc-
tively diverted in order to capture rents generated
by state intervention.3 Rents are unproductive when
they are spent in resource re-allocation rather than
resource creation (Buchanan 1980). Attempting to
eliminate rent-seeking without changing the condi-
tions in which rents are generated, merely changes
the locus of rents. Significantly, state restrictions on
private activity (such as licensing) generate creden-
tials - rights to engage in activity that is restricted by
the state - the possession of which gives the cre-
dential holder access to rents. Activity then focuses
on the acquisition (by private agents) and disburse-
ment (by the state) of these credentials, leading over
time to a situation where the activity negatively
affects people's perception of the legitimacy of the
economy system (Krueger 1974; Chang 1994).
Whatever the merits of the core idea underlying
rent-seeking the concept can be, and is, widely
interpreted. In our context two points need men-
tioning: i) t is unclear whether rent-seeking is bad
because it generates high transaction-costs or
whether it is the transfer element which is a prob-
lem; and ii) it is possible to find societies which sur-
vive with high levels of rent-seeking and yet achieve
both political stability and economic growth (Khan
1989; Chang 1994). Confusion lies in the fact that
there are two judgements involved here: whether it
is the costs generated by rent-seeking that under-
mine state capacity, or whether it is the rights that
generate rents that undermine state capacity To
elucidate this issue, we need to introduce some the-
oretical clarifications which trace the links between
rent-seeking, corruption and clientelism.
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State intervention has been identified by sociolo-
gists as an arena of patron-client transactions. The
seminal work on this subject in the context of South
Asia is that of Khan (1989). Khan argues the
importance of one particular form of patron-client
exchanges - 'clientelism' - which provides an expla-
nation alternative to that of rent-seeking for differ-
ences in the efficiency of states over time and
between countries. In his article in this Bulletin,
Khan explicates the linkages between clientelism,
corruption and rent-seeking; on which the follow-
ing argument is heavily based.
3 Clientelism, Rights and Fiscal
Policy: Some Political-Fiscal
Accounting
We begin by defining the fiscal surplus as the sum
of income flows and wealth stocks to which the
state has access through its tax and borrowing
instruments given the institutional arrangements in
a particular society What are the elements of fiscal
surplus? Institutional arrangements, in the above
definition, pertain to the structure of rights extant
in a given society plus the political settlement that
legitimates these rights.4 Typically, the rights gener-
ating government revenues are the rights to tax, to
borrow, to run a deficit and, in the context of an
open economy to bargain internationally to secure
credit and aid. In a mixed economy, we can add to
this the state's ability to impose restrictions on the
activities of other agents. Thus the state's ability to
impose restrictions on the activity of potentially
competitive agents can earn it revenues from pro-
ductive activity and from direct investment of the
resources it accumulates.
The rights generating government expenditures are
more complex. Clearly, the very nature and scope
of the political settlement itself generates state
expenditures. The precise magnitudes and pattern
of state expenditure are dependent on the concrete
historical nature of the political settlement. In gen-
eral, the fact that the state is vested with coercive
power generates security expenditure. Further,
some expenditures flow from the very rights that
Rents are defined as 'that part of the payment to an For a definition of 'political stt1ement', see Khan
owner of resources over and above that which those (1996).
resources could command in any alternative use'
(Buchanan 1980: 3).
generate revenues. In industrial democracies, the
existence of a welfare state generates an ensemble of
taxes and transfers, involving rights which generate
revenues as well as expenditures. In command
economies and in many mixed economies, the
rights to impose restrictions upon the activity of
agents generates expenditures for the state in terms
of contingent productive activities that the state
itself must undertake. In India, for example, the
right to exclude private ownership of banks directly
obliges the state to provide banking services. Thus,
while 'general services' derive fairly unambiguously
from the minimal functions of the state, 'social' and
'economic' services involve a more complex set of
expenditures.
Where institutional arrangements do not constrain
the incidence of the government's fiscal rights, the
entire resources of the economy would be the basis
for fiscal incidence and there would then be a
one-to-one relationship between the size of the
GDP, the growth rate and the fiscal surplus.
However, wherever institutional arrangements are
imperfect and rights are weakly defined, there arises
a disjuncture between fiscal incidence in terms
of the way in which it is measured in mainstream
economics and institutionally constrained fiscal
incidence.
The disposable fiscal surplus is the surplus that
the state can actually dispose of after the pre-emp-
tive claims to it, including stability payments
(defined below) have been made. How the state
allocates the disposable fiscal surplus would
depend, in the simplest analysis, on the decision
makers' perception of how the net present value of
social output can be maximized given the political
arrangements in place. It differs from the fiscal sur-
plus to the extent that revenue, debt and public
expenditure are affected by the need to maintain the
political settlement. It is the disposable fiscal sur-
plus that is of central importance to the develop-
mental state, since it is the difference between the
fiscal surplus and the disposable fiscal surplus that
affects the capacity of the developmental state to
articulate a development strategy
Stability payments occur in situations where stabil-
ity is a continuous political issue because the rights
to certain key assets are continuously contested.
Stability payments have two components. When
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the contest centres around well-defined rights, then
the process of contestation can be viewed as a con-
straint on the maximization of net present value of
social product. Rent-seeking is a term that seeks to
describe these contingent payoffs. The payoffs -
which we shall describe as 'clientelist payoffs' - in
line with Khan's definition of clientelism - accrue
not through some constrained maximization of net
present social product but because clientelist lob-
bies present an immediate threat to disrupt the abil-
ity of those in charge of the state to discharge their
functions.
This is an important difference. The rent-seeking
literature does not distinguish between societies on
the basis of the stability of the political settlement.
Hence, in that framework, clientelism and rent-
seeking cannot be distinguished. The stability of
the political settlement matters because, while
clientelist payoffs are the outcome of weakly
defined rights of existing right holders and a dis-
tribution of organizational rights that allows payoffs
to be gainfully bargained by clientelist organizers,
rents are by contrast the outcome of well defined
state-imposed restrictions on the market. Rents are
generated by scarcity and by the restricted legality
of certain types of economic activity where some
right holders obtain economic power and creden-
tials which entitle them to capture the difference
between scarcity and free-market prices. This dif-
ference is generated by the fact that the ability to
supply a particular commodity is restricted by cre-
dentials (licenses, membership of clubs, parties,
lobbies, but also caste and gender, etc.). Clientelist
payoffs, conversely, do not originate from the
restrictions of supply as a consequence of rights
over credentials but, rather, from the ability of a
coalition to generate an increase in its resource flow
by exerting pressure against existing right-holders.
Clientelist surplus appropriation is thus based on
the direct bargaining of clientelist lobbies with
existing right-holders rather than through restrict-
ing the supply of specific goods in the market
through protecting rights over credentials. Thus, a
growth in the number of rent-extracting credential
holders for a particular commodity would 'squeeze'
rents, unless market demand for these restricted
items grew rapidly enough. However, an increase
in the size of a clientelist coalition, would normally
increase the amount of resources captured by that
coalition (or total clientelist appropriation) because
the growth in its political power would increase the
demand for its services.5
In a dynamic context, the revenue and spending
aspects of the fiscal surplus can be closely related.
Clientelism clearly has a negative effect on the fiscal
surplus. An increase in clientelist power can result
in a growth in the magnitude of resources outside
the reach of the resource mobilization mechanism
and represent a potentially major source of variance
between the aggregate fiscal surplus and the dispos-
able fiscal surplus. The 'political fiscal statement'
(for want of a better phrase) of government activity
indicates at a highly simplified level the separate
effects of clientelism and rent-seeking on fiscal poi-
icy (Figure 1). In it, revenue and expenditure by
government is related to the domain of particular
rights. This is not yet the beginning of a theory but
merely an attempt to illustrate how such a frame-
work can facilitate a better understanding of the
politics of fiscal policy
In Figure 1, rent-seeking is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with rights, as a result of which this type
of activity can potentially generate both revenue
and expenditure flows. The ability of the state to
meet clientelist payoffs, however, arises as a conse-
quence of rights being weakly defined. For this rea-
son clientelism is not a phenomenon which can be
traced to the existence of a specific set of rights
since, unlike rent-seeking, it generates no receipts
and is an unambiguous drain on the disposable
fiscal surplus.
In Figure 1, the disposable fiscal surplus would
constitute the excess of the left side over the lower
half of the right side. This differentiation is made
on the basis of the difference between the rights
(and the bargaining over them) that generate stabil-
ity payments, and other rights. With weakly
defined rights, the payoffs in the lower right half of
the statement would cause the conventionally mea-
sured revenues in the top left half of the statement
to be lower than expected. Conventional public
expenditure analysis of transfers and subsidies,
which ignore rights, cannot distinguish between
transfers and subsidies, as we have done, in terms
of their sources in the structure and definitiveness
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of rights that generate them. Further, even
approaches (such as the New Institutional
Economics) which do discuss alternative allocations
of rights without addressing the question of how
well rights are defined or whether they are present
or absent, would be unable to distinguish between
rent-seeking and clientelist payoffs.
4 Indian Fiscal Policy, the Black
Economy and Corruption
The 'black economy' in this article refers to all activ-
ities, legal and illegal which are hidden from the fis-
cal authorities. This definition is primarily a fiscal
definition, the source of concern being not the
legality or legitimacy of the economy activity in
question, but the fiscal implications of such activity
As such, it is an appropriate definition if the con-
cern is, as here, with identifying the scope of activ-
ities that can and do detract from the disposable
fiscal surplus.
4.1 Where do corruption and
rent-seeking fit into the black
economy?
Corruption can be defined in a number of ways
This is because what is, or is not, an illegal activity
is defined by prohibitive laws which vary over time
and space. It is too simple to see corruption as
merely activities that infringe the law for monetary
gain. Corruption is a legal-political construct in
that its magnitude and consequences are dependent
on the political settlement. The pervasiveness of
corruption is a problem when and if the political
settlement requires the maintenance and enforce-
ment of rights. In the context of the political-econ-
omy, the maintenance of well defined property
rights is inhibited by corruption. Here, the magni-
tude of corruption is important in its impact on the
political settlement and on rights. Corruption is a
fundamental attack on the stability of the politico-
economic system. Popular literature on the 'evils' of
corruption focus more on this problem.6
However, this is not the problem caused by corrup-
tion in the rent-seeking literature. In that literature
corruption reflects a particular distribution of rents,
This distinction is elaborated in Khan (1989). A useful collection of such literature can be found in
Monga and Sanctis (1984).
in themselves generated by the restriction of the
activities of producing and consuming agents
through the supply of credentials by the state.
Corruption here only signals the distribution of
rents between those employed in the public sector
and those outside it; in principle it makes no differ-
ence if these rents were distributed differently State
failure in the NPE and liberal pluralist paradigms is
consistent with rent-seeking. In fact rent-seeking is
exposed as a major reason for reducing the scope
and role of the state in economic activity (Lal 1988).
Public 'corruption' signals economic inefficiency
rather than political instability
4.2 Clientelism, corruption and
fiscal policy
To what extent does clientelism generate black eco-
nomic activity? This depends on the sources of
attrition from the disposable fiscal surplus that are
caused by clientelist activity The areas and magni-
tudes of clientelist activity require location in a par-
ticular context. If corruption is a significant source
of a drain in the disposable fiscal surplus then rent-
seeking explanations would be valid. On the other
hand, if other types of clientelist activity cause a
lower disposable fiscal surplus then the rent-seek-
ing diagnosis, and the implied correction - a shrink-
age in the domain of state intervention - would be
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invalid. Corruption would then be a symptom of
the wider emergence of clientelism.
What impact does black income generation have on
the disposable fiscal surplus? Clearly, the most
obvious impact is that of reducing the size of the fis-
cal surplus itself. The larger the size of the black
economy, the lower, ceteris paribus, the tax base.
Further, if there is a positive relationship between
black income and public expenditure, then this
reduces the disposable fiscal surplus - indeed this
would be the focus of 'rent-seeking' type analyses.
Hence, if we are able to investigate the mode of
black income generation and its disposition, we can
obtain clues as to whether clientelistic activity is an
important element in the reduction in the dispos-
able fiscal surplus.
4.3 The black economy in India
The black economy has been a source of concern in
India. This concern arises from the persistently low
and declining share of direct taxation (Table 1) and
its relatively low elasticity and buoyancy
A series of committees and independent scholars
(GOl 1978, 1985; Chugh and Uppal 1986) have
reported corruption as a major cause of the black
economy The size and volume of public corruption
Figure 1 A Political fiscal statement of government fiscal activity
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was cited as an important reason for the vicious
nature of the black income-tax evasion nexus. At
the same time, the size and volume of the black
economy in India is viewed as providing major
empirical support for rent-seeking arguments. It is
argued that extensive state intervention and ton-
trols gave rise to a large underground economy and
to increasing exaction of rents by those managing
these controls. Jointly these activities contributed
in a major way to the 'softening' of the budget con-
straint and to state failure (Lal 1988).
The clearest ideas on the source, magnitude and
impact of black transactions on government fiscal
policy are contained in a government report (hence-
forth GOl 1985) on 'black' activities in India. 'Black
money' can be defined in several ways, but if the
focus of interest is on its impact on the fiscal sur-
plus, then we can use the official definition from
the report: 'The aggregate of incomes which are
taxable but are not reported to the tax authorities'
(GOl 1985: 7). This term includes tax-evaded
legal income plus all illegal incomes and transfer
payments.
In aggregate terms, of the several estimates of the
magnitude of black income generation in India the
most recent is the GOl 1985 report which came up
with two estimates of black income generated in
India, presented in Table 2.
While these estimates indicate the magnitude of
the problem, a detailed analysis indicates that the
major problem with black noney generation is not
public corruption and rent-seeking, at least in a
proximate way
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To substantiate, we look at black money generation
in the public sector. Black income generating oppor-
tunities in the public sector can be distinguished by
public controls over private sector activity and by
direct public sector participation in economic activ-
ity. In both these categories, corruption reduces
the disposable fiscal surplus when it constitutes an
illegal transfer from the public account to private
individuals, unlike bribes between individuals
which do not alter the total of gross personal
income in the economy or the distribution of pub-
lic and private national product. Hence, and in
view of our distinction between clientelism and
rent-seeking, it is the latter that must be at the focus
of our attention.
The GOl 1985 report did not attempt any system-
atic calculation of the volumes of such transfers.
Instead, it viewed piecemeal evidence from previ-
ous literature which indicated that leakages were a
pervasive phenomenon. From the evidence, it ïs
possible to make the following simple macroeco-
nomic calculation to generate a conservative point-
estimate of 'leakages' from the public sector for two
years, 1975-76 and 1980-81.
Government expenditure = Government purchases
of commodities and services + Payments of wages
and salaries + Gross public capital formation.
Deducting the third item leaves us with the corrup-
tion base. Assuming a 10 per cent rate of leakage
from the remainder gives us a 'leakage' ratio
amounting to between 10 and 15 per cent of total
government final expenditure in 1992-93 and no
more than between 5 and 6 per cent of total black
Table 1 Direct and indirect tax/GDP ratios by level of government
All India Taxes
Year All Direct Indirect
1950-51 6.56 2.42 4.14
1955-56 7.48 2.52 4.96
1960-61 8.99 2.68 6.31
1965-66 12.12 3.04 9.08
1970-71 11.80 2.50 9.30
1975-76 15.04 3.35 11.69
1980-81 15.57 2.56 13.01
1985-86 17.76 2.57 15.19
income (GOT 1985 estimate) in both. 1975-76 and
1980-81.
The 10 per cent leakage rate was estimated on the
following basis:
i GOT 1985 found from literature and investiga-
tions that a bribe of 9-15 per cent was the stan-
dard 'take' for construction activity;
GOT 1985 stresses that leakages from purchases
of commodities and services need to be cör-
rected for the fact that the central government
supplies department and public enterprises
often purchased goods and services from other
public sector enterprises, definitionally not
allowing for black money generation there;
in foreign suppliers allow for a cushion of 7 per
cent in the supply of goods and services to the
public sector according to GOT 1985.
To this we can add the 'kickbacks' from private
sector investment to public managers and bureau-
crats. This amounts to Rs. 1690 million for 1975-
This is bed ort a questionnaire to all Income Tax
Commissions.
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76 and Rs. 2170 million for 1980-81, using the
same 10 per cent criterion, applied here to total pri-
vate capital formation. The total volumes are again
not significant or predominant in the global pic-
ture of black income generation provided by the
GOT (1985) report (Table 2).
From this global calculation of the magnitude of
black income in India, it can be inferred that 'leak-
ages' from public and private sector activities
amounted to no more than 4.09 per cent of total
black income in 19 75-76 and 3.6 per cent in 1980-
81. Indeed the bulk of black income generation
comes from weakness in state fiscal capacity
reflected in either activities outside the ambit of the
GDP accounting mechanism or activities that relate
to property transactions (GOT 1985: 342-343).
More clues are provided by looking at the sources of
black income generation and the forms in which
black wealth is held. The speculation that black
income is generated through clientelist activity is
based on a study of its sectoral generation, part of
GOT (1985). We have ranked the sectors which
this study found significant in generating black
Table 2 Two global point estimates of black income generated in India
(Rs. million)
Item 1975-76 1980-81
Tax evaded income 37410 98130
Illegal activities 33180-49780 57130 to 85700
Under-declared immovable
property values 22560 36640
Leakages from the public sector 1540 (maximum) 4190 (maximum)
Leakages from the private
corporate sector 2530 (maximum) 3250 (maximum)
Under invoicing of exports 1390 2350
Global black money estimate 99580 to 118700 203620 to 236780
As a percentage of GDP at factor
cost, current prices 15 to 18 18 to 21
Leakages total (and as % of
black income) 4070 (4.09) 7440 (3.66)
activities in Table 3. Except large-scale manufac-
turing, the other significant areas of black income
generation were found to be primarily areas of petty
bourgeois activity - the domain of the 'trader,
contractor and estate agent'. This points to the
build-up of a significant wealth-owning and wealth-
generating constituency outside the dominant
coalition as defined by Bardhan (1984).8
The mode of black income generation and the
forms of holding black wealth would also tell us
more about the locus of black activity If corruption
The rise of this group and its role in accumulation and
disposition of black income is detailed in Roy (1994)
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is important then one would expect a significant
chunk of black income to be held in bertami busi-
nesses. In the GOl (1985) survey, the most signifi-
cant mode of generating black income was found to
be either complete or major understatement of
gross receipts, a purely private corporate sector
activity Benami financial investment was held to be
the least significant of the four modes of black
income generation (Table 3). Finally the form in
which wealth generated from black activity was
held was found, typically, to be not cash - (the
form in which corruption is often paid off) - but
Benami businesses are businesses run by agents of
those who invest in the business, enabling the actUal
owners to conceal their ownership. This is the obvious
way in which corrupt proceeds can be invested.
Table 3 Aspects of the black economy in India: Selected data from the
NIPFP qualitative study
Sectors/Activities Significance Rating (%)





Large Scale Manufacturing 89.5
Hotels, Restaurants, etc. 43.6
Road Transport 50.0
Illegal Activities Generating Black Income
Smuggling 90.8
Selling of Licences & Permits 48.4
Kickbacks, Bribes, etc. 57.4
Capital Gains on Real Estate Transactions 92.4
Methods of Black Income Generation
Suppression or Understatement of Gross Receipts 96.1
Exaggeration of Expenses 83.6
Under Valuation of Assets 83.6
'Benami' Business 51.5
Forms in Which Black Wealth is Held
Shown as Income Deriving from Agricultural Activity 93.7
Undervalues Real Estate 96.0
Held in Precious Metals or Jewellery 74.6
Undervalued Business Equipment, Stocks, etc. 65.1
undervalued real estate and stock in trade and
previous metals, both forms in which black wealth
is typically held by the 'nouveaux riches' trader-
contractors.
5 ConclusIon
The relationship between corruption, rent-seeking
and state failure in India is more ambivalent than
the present consensus suggests. Corruption can be
placed in context by looking at its impact on the
disposable fiscal surplus, particularly its role as a
subset of activities generating black income.
Corruption does nbt have any major direct impact
° Recent investigations in India reveal that little
attention has been paid since 1985 to the phenomenon
of black income generation and the attendant
consequences of corruption. A recently released report
on political corruption (Government.of India 1995)
mentioned, but did not explore the problem
highlighted. Access to the documents accompanying
the latter report, presently confidential, may provide
fresh information when released.
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